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As of this writing, the New Hampshire primary is scheduled to take place in just about two months—on Tuesday, February 9, just eight days 
after the first nomination contest, the Iowa caucuses. 
Numerous polls have already told us what the voters 
are contemplating “if the election were held today.” In 
interpreting what the polls mean for the actual primary 
election, however, we need to take into consideration 
several caveats.
1. Voters are mostly undecided (even close 
to election day).
The polls typically pressure respondents to say 
how they would vote if the election were held 
immediately, and so most poll respondents will 
give some name. But that doesn’t mean they are 
committed to that candidate. Typically, leading up 
to the election, anywhere between half to three-
quarters of the voters are still trying to decide whom 
to choose. That means that last-minute swings in 
support are quite possible and quite common.
For example, in the 2012 primary, 29 percent of 
GOP voters indicated right before the election that they 
were still unsure as to which candidate they would vote 
for. Two months before the 2012 primary, 59 percent 
were unsure. Two months before the 2016 primary, 55 
percent of Republicans and 45 percent of Democrats 
say they still have not decided who they will vote for.
2. Even “decided” voters can change their 
minds at the last minute—because there are 
no party differences among candidates.
In a general election contest, voters’ preferences are 
highly influenced by their party affiliation. Even vot-
ers who know little about a candidate can still rely 
on the candidate’s party as an indicator of whom to 
choose. But in a primary contest, there is no party 
difference to anchor voter preferences. Often the 
policy differences among candidates are so slight, 
the voter could just as easily vote for one candidate 





campaign activities that suddenly favor one candi-
date over another could cause a major swing in voter 
preferences in just a short time.
3. Pollsters’ predictions of voter turnout are 
fraught with problems that can distort results.
Unlike many states, New Hampshire allows any 
resident of voting age to participate in the primary, 
even if they are not previously registered. Anywhere 
from 10 to 15 percent of a New Hampshire primary 
electorate consists of people who register to vote at 
the polls on Election Day. Many pollsters use past pri-
mary voting lists as their source for sampling respon-
dents, but that approach would exclude the “walk-in” 
voters, who could be quite different from the rest of 
the voters—thus resulting in misleading poll results.
4. Final pre-election polls in the New 
Hampshire primary have often been right, 
but almost as often, they have been wrong.
Because of the factors mentioned above, polling in 
the New Hampshire primary has been inconsistent 
in its accuracy. In 2008, the polls did an excellent job 
in predicting the Republican winner (John McCain), 
but they were all wrong in predicting the Democratic 
winner (Hillary Clinton, not Barack Obama as the 
polls showed). Other years in which the polling in 
New Hampshire differed significantly from the final 
results include 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 
1992, 1996, and 2000. 
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The major problem is that the polls typically stop two 
to three days before the election, and therefore don’t catch 
changes that occur right before people vote. Exit polls 
(taken as voters leave the voting booths) have consistently 
shown that up to one-third or more of New Hampshire 
voters say they made up their minds only in the last three 
days before the election, including one in six who say they 
made up their minds on Election Day itself. 
Given these caveats, it’s prudent to take a skeptical 
look at what the polls are showing us. They measure 
voters’ top-of-mind reactions to the candidates, but 
with no guarantee that the voters will retain those 
views as the election approaches. 
The Iowa Effect 
One thing to keep in mind is that the Iowa caucuses 
just eight days before the New Hampshire primary 
can upend candidate standings in New Hampshire, 
rendering irrelevant any polls taken prior to the 
Iowa contest. Unfortunately for pundits, the Iowa 
Effect is not always predictable. 
For Republicans, recent history suggests the Iowa 
results have little effect on a candidate’s standing in 
New Hampshire. Such was the case for George W. Bush 
in 2000, who won Iowa but lost big to John McCain in 
New Hampshire. Similarly, Mike Huckabee (2008) and 
Rick Santorum (2012) did not see any boost in their 
New Hampshire standings after winning in Iowa. 
However, not-so-recent history provides a different 
lesson. In 1980, for example, George H. W. Bush was 
initially helped in New Hampshire by winning in Iowa, 
as was Bob Dole in 1988. And in 1996, Pat Buchanan 
was helped by his second place showing in Iowa. 
While history gives us a mixed message about the 
effect of Iowa on New Hampshire for Republicans, a 
good showing in Iowa for Democrats typically helps 
the candidate in New Hampshire. That was the case 
with Obama in 2008, John Kerry in 2004, Richard 
Gephardt and Paul Simon in 1988, Gary Hart in 1984, 
and Jimmy Carter in 1980 and 1976. The good show-
ings in Iowa did not always translate into victories in 
New Hampshire (for example, Obama, and Gephardt 
and Simon), but they did give the candidates a boost.
For 2016, the Iowa Effect seems uncertain for the 
GOP, but perhaps a bit more predictable for Democrats. 
One explanation why Iowa seems to have no effect 
on New Hampshire for the Republican candidates in 
recent times is that the electorates in the two states are 
quite different. Exit polls in 2008 and 2012, for example, 
show that 12 percent and 17 percent of Iowa caucus 
voters respectively considered themselves “moderate” 
or “liberal,” compared with 45 percent and 47 percent 
respectively of New Hampshire primary voters. Also, the 
percentage of evangelicals in Iowa is almost three times 
greater than in New Hampshire: In 2008, 23 percent in 
New Hampshire, 60 percent in Iowa; in 2012, 22 percent 
in New Hampshire, 57 percent in Iowa.
By contrast, the ideological profile of Democratic 
voters in Iowa and New Hampshire are quite similar: In 
2008, the last competitive cycle, exit polls showed Iowa 
with liberals outnumbering moderates/conservatives 
by 54 percent to 46 percent, while in New Hampshire 
the comparable figures were 57 percent to 43 percent. 
Given these data, one could speculate that for 
Democrats, a victory in Iowa for either Bernie Sanders 
or Hillary Clinton could give the winner a boost in 
New Hampshire.
For Republicans, such speculation would be iffy. 
The GOP contest is complicated by Donald Trump, 
whose support appears fairly robust with both the very 
conservative/evangelical wing and also the less conser-
vative wing of the party. One effect of Iowa, if not to 
help the top two or three candidates get a boost in New 
Hampshire (and Iowa may—or may not—do that), is 
that the Iowa caucus results may well reduce the slate 
of candidates. For both parties, Iowa has typically had a 
screening effect, with only the top two or three candi-
dates able to continue effectively into New Hampshire.
Still, even that pattern may be upset this year, 
because of the large amounts of money available to 
candidates from rich donors—and because of the 
unusually large number of candidates. The screening 
process could be much slower this year, with well-
funded candidates able to continue their campaigns 
even if they lose in several of the early contests. 
As for current polls predicting the winners in New 
Hampshire, history suggests considerable caution. As 
that famous Yogi-ism warns us, “It ain’t over till it’s over.”
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